Statement by H. E. Ambassador Gianfranco Incarnato  
Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament  
Geneva, 16 May 2018

Subsidiary Body 2

Mr. Coordinator,

At the outset, let me congratulate you on your appointment and thank you for your willingness to guide the works of Subsidiary Body 2. Please rest assured of my delegation’s full support and cooperation.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation stand high in the CD agenda and are among the priorities of Italy’s foreign policy. For this reason, we greatly welcome that the Conference is resuming its substantive discussions also on these topics.

Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered yesterday by the European Union. Let me add some remarks in my national capacity.

Mr. Coordinator,

I am particularly pleased that we are starting the implementation of the two important decisions we adopted during the first part of this year’s session with a discussion on an FMCT. Indeed, the immediate commencement within the CD of negotiations of a Treaty dealing with fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains a key priority for Italy.

In our view, such a Treaty will allow us to make a fundamental step to advance both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It will represent one of the effective measures which are needed in order to attain and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons, as envisaged by Article VI of the NPT, and in accordance with a concrete and progressive approach to nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Coordinator,

In the framework of this Subsidiary Body, we don’t need to start from scratch. The CD and its Member States have already put an incredible amount of effort in presenting and refining their respective views on the future Treaty and on its key aspects, also with a view to bridging differences and promoting the emergence of shared understandings and common ground.

So, according to your suggestions on how to structure these first two meetings, let me now concentrate on areas of commonality.

Firstly, in our view, the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion an FMCT is widely shared. Even more importantly, there is general agreement that such negotiations should take place in the CD.

The current security situation – characterized by growing tensions, new conflicts, arms proliferation, and a fast-changing environment – further adds to this sense of urgency.
Secondly, we all agree that the future treaty should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable. This in turn has led to an emerging consensus on its general structure and on some of the key elements it should encompass, most notably in relation to a definition of fissile material and the inclusion of provisions on verification.

In Italy’s view, a definition of fissile material should be broad enough to make the future Treaty credible and effective, but not so extensive as to entail unacceptably complex and expensive verification procedures.

The issue of verification is also key, since ultimately the credibility of the Treaty will rest on its verification provisions and on how these will ensure compliance with its obligations.

We believe that verification should focus on declared production and facilities, thus allowing to detect and prevent the diversion of fissile materials to prohibited activities.

The verification regime should also provide credible assurances that no undeclared fissile material production occurs and no undeclared facilities exist.

I will provide more detailed elements on both of these points in the next sessions of this Subsidiary Body.

Mr. Coordinator,

Our past discussions – including in the framework of the Way Ahead Working Group last year - demonstrated that there is a range of options for dealing with the issues of definitions, verification, and scope of the future Treaty.

However, regardless of the specific choices that we will make, we are all aware that an FMCT would be a valuable new element of the international security architecture. Not only will it stop the production of fissile material for weapons, but it will also create a verification system that would cover all production facilities and provide a mechanism that could support nuclear disarmament, also through a dedicated legal framework and organizational structure.

We are aware that remaining differences among us should not be underestimated. However, we hope that the work of this SB will help narrowing these differences. We are also confident that, under the able leadership of Canada, the High Level Expert Preparatory Group established by the UN General Assembly will contribute to this goal and we look forward to its report later this year.

My delegation stands ready to support any productive effort to encourage the search for a common ground and the early commencement of a negotiating process without preconditions on this issue.

Thank you.