Mr. Coordinator,

First of all, I would like to thank you for the documentation you prepared for our discussions for today and the next sessions of this Subsidiary Body.

The documents are currently under close consideration in capital. For the moment I would like to share some preliminary observations on the element of scope. With your permission, since I will not be able to attend tomorrow morning’s session, I will add a few remarks also on the question of verification.

Mr. Coordinator,

Italy shares the view that defining fissile material will be essential for the future Treaty.

Generally, we believe that such a definition should be broad enough to make the future Treaty credible and effective, but not so extensive as to entail unacceptably complex and expensive verification procedures. Principally, this involves including under the scope of the Treaty the relevant Uranium and Plutonium isotopes.

Keeping the definition of fissile material as close as possible to real-life conditions would, in our opinion, facilitate the negotiation, drafting and implementation of the Treaty.

An international definition of fissile material could be that of “un-irradiated direct use fissile material” as currently employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Our work on this topic, therefore, should start from this.

The issue of verification is also key, since ultimately the credibility of the Treaty will rest on its verification provisions and on how these will ensure compliance with its obligations.

In our view, verification should focus on declared production and facilities so as to allow for detecting and deterring the diversion of fissile materials to prohibited activities.

The verification regime should also provide credible assurances that no undeclared fissile material production occurs and no undeclared facilities exist. In this regard, we believe that existing IAEA inspection standards could represent a useful reference for the Treaty negotiators.

We strongly support a non-discriminatory verification regime under which all States Parties are subjected to the same obligations. At the same time, we recognize that verification methods, tools and techniques might have to be tailored to specific national contexts, entailing different
verification objectives and challenges. Also in this case the IAEA verification standards should be useful as a means to facilitate non-discrimination.

In drafting the verification provisions of the Treaty, what is essentially a cost-benefit analysis will have to be conducted, in order to create a system allowing for comprehensive and credible results, at a reasonable cost.

As you reminded us in your letter from 18 June, different approaches to verification have been identified, namely the focused, the comprehensive and the hybrid approach. Each of these entails different benefits and drawbacks, and further discussions on this point would be necessary.

Another question requiring further consideration is whether past production of fissile material should also be accounted for and verified under an FMCT, in order to provide a clear baseline against which to assess and verify compliance with its provisions.

To enable effective verification relating to production facilities, States Parties should be required to provide an initial declaration; the Treaty should then contain clear provisions for the updating to these initial declarations.

As for the possible verification toolbox, Italy believes that existing methods, tools, and techniques employed in relevant multilateral and bilateral fora, most notably the IAEA, should form its core. We are also aware, however, that further analysis is needed to understand how these could apply to an FMCT’s context.

Mr Coordinator,

Italy welcomes the recent conclusion of the work of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group established by UNGA resolution 71/259. We believe that, together with the results of the GGE on FMCT that published its report in 2015, the results of the High Level Group will provide a very useful input for the negotiations of an FMCT within the CD, which remains one of Italy’s key priorities in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this regard, we continue to consider the Shannon mandate as a possible basis for discussions. In our interpretation, its structure, based on constructive ambiguity, makes the Mandate flexible enough to allow starting possible negotiations without prejudging the positions of those countries in favor of addressing the issue of existing stocks.

Thank you.